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Abstract
Competing bimodal coalitions among a group of actors are discussed. First, a
model from political sciences is revisited. Most of the model statements are found
not to be contained in the model. Second, a new coalition model is built. It ac-
counts for local versus global alignment with respect to the joining of a coalition.
The existence of two competing world coaltions is found to yield one unique sta-
ble distribution of actors. On the opposite a unique world leadership allows the
emergence of unstable relationships. In parallel to regular actors which have a clear
coalition choice, “neutral”, “frustrated” and “risky” actors are produced. The cold
war organisation after world war II is shown to be rather stable. The emergence
of a fragmentation process from eastern group disappearance is explained as well
as continuing western group stability. Some hints are obtained about possible poli-
cies to stabilize world nation relationships. European construction is analyzed with
respect to european stability. Chinese stability is also discussed.
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1 Introduction
Mathematical tools and physical concepts might be a promishing way to describe social
collective phenomena. Several attempts along these lines have been made in past years,
in particular to study strike process [1], political organisations [2], group decision making
[3], social impact [4, 5], outbreak of cooperation [6], power genesis in groups [7, 8] and
stock market [9].
However such an approach should be carefully controlled. A straightforward mapping
of a physical theory built for a physical reality onto a social reality could be rather
misleading. It could lead at best to a nice metaphore without predictability and at worst
to a wrong social theory.
Physics has been successful in describing macroscopic behavior from microscopic prop-
erties. The task here, is to borrow from physics those techniques and concepts used to
tackle the complexity of aggregations. In parallel the challenge is to build a collective
theory of social behavior along similar lines, but within the specific constraints of the
psycho-social reality. The contribution from physics should thus be restricted to qualita-
tive guidelines for the mathematical modeling of complex social realities. Such a limitation
does not make the program less ambitious.
Working at the edge of interdisciplinarity between social sciences and physical sci-
ences has different inherant dangers for respectively the physicist and the social scientist.
Coming from the physics side it is to stay in physics using a social terminology within a
physical formalism. On the opposite, from the other side the danger is to dress subjective
belief under a pseudo-scientific langage.
In a recent work Axelrod and Bennett used the physical concept of minimum energy to
build a landscape model (hereafter denoted as AB) of aggregation [10]. Possible coalitions
and choices various entities can make among them are studied in this Statistical Physics
based model.
In this paper we first position the AB model within the field of Statistical Physics. A
change in variables and a gauge transformation are shown to map the AB model exactly
to a T = 0 finite ferromagnetic Ising system. On this basis most AB statements are shown
to be misleading with respect to their actual model. They are indeed confusing a Mattis
spin glass and an Edwards-Anderson spin glass [11].
However along above analysis, a new coalition model can indeed be built to describe
alignment and competition among a group of actors. The model is found to embody main
properties claimed in the AB model. Temperature-like instabilities are introduced in the
model using a concept of strange actor.
The following of the paper is organized as follows. The second part contains a review
of the AB model. in Section 3 a new set of variables is shown to map the model onto
a “zero temperature” finite Ising ferromagnet. Using this mapping in Section 4 most
AB statements are found not compatible with the model. Their model turns out to
be indeed a Mattis spin glass-like while their comments are drawn from the physics of
an Edwards-Anderson spin glass. Section 5 deals with a presentation of a new model to
describe alignment phenomena. Our model produces several new features in the dynamics
of bimodal coalitions. Nato versus Warsaw Pact are analysed. Stability of respectively
Europe and China is discussed. Hints to include instabilities in the model are presented
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in Section 6. Last Section contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Axelrod-Bennett (AB) model
Axelrod and Bennett (AB ) address the problem of alignment between two competing
coalitions within a group of n countries [10]. A set of positive variables {si} accounts
for various actor sizes where index i runs from 1 to n. A pairwise propensity pij is also
considered among each pairs of actors. It is positive for cases of cooperation and negative
in cases of conflicts. Propensities are assumed to be symmetric, i.e., pij = pji.
Each actor has then the choice to be in either one of two coalitions. A distance dij is
then introduced between each pair of actors i and j. It is dij = 0 if i and j belong to the
same coalition while dij = 1 when they belong to different coalitions.
Given a configuration X of actors, a quantity called “frustration” (not to be confused
with the spin glass frustration),
Fi =
n∑
j=1
sjpijdij(X) , (1)
is defined for each nation, where the summation is taken over all other countries including
i itself with pii ≡ 0. Given a configuration X , all country frustrations sum up to an
“energy”,
E(X) =
∑
i
siFi . (2)
This “energy” which measures the level of propensity satisfactions is rewritten,
E(X) =
n∑
i>j
sisjpijdij(X) , (3)
where the sum runs over the n(n− 1)/2 distinct pairs (i, j). Eq.(3) is the central formula
of AB model.
It is then postulated that actual configuration is the one which minimizes the energy
E(X). There exist by symmetry 2n/2 distinct sets of alliances since each country has
2 choices for coalition. Starting from some initial configuration, Axelrod and Bennett
treats the problem numerically. A dynamics of the system is implemented by single actor
coalition flips. An actor turns to the competing coalition only if the flip decreases its local
energy. The system has reached its stable state once no more flip occurs. Given {si, pij},
the {dij} are thus obtained minimizing Eq. (3). Axelrod and Bennett made following
statements about their model.
(a) Eq. (1) shows “that the source of conflict with a small country is not as important
for determining alignment as an equivalent source of conflict with a large country”
[10, p. 214].
(b) The physical concept of frustration [11] is said to be embodied in their model with
“For example, if there are three nations that mutually dislike each other (such as
Israel, Syria and Iraq), then any possible bipolar configuration will leave someone
frustrated” [10, p. 217].
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(c) It is stated that alignment can be predicted in real cases with “Landscape theory begins
with sizes and pairwise propensities ... to make predictions about the dynamics of
the system” [10, p. 217].
We will show below (Section 4) that indeed these three statements are misleading with
repect to AB model content.
3 The AB model is a “T = 0” problem
The introduction of a new set of variables shows AB model to map onto a “T = 0” finite
Ising ferromagnet. First the two coalitions are denoted respectively by A and B. Then
a variable ηi is associated to each actor. It is ηi = +1 if actor i belongs to alliance A
while ηi = −1 in case it is part of alliance B. From symmetry all A-members can turn to
coalition B with a simultaneous flip of all B-members to coalition A.
Given a pair of actors (i, j) their respective alignment is readily expressed through
the product ηiηj . The product is +1 when i and j belong to the same coalition and −1
otherwise. Using variables {ηi}, distance dij can be recast exactly under the form,
dij =
1
2
(1− ηiηj) , (4)
and the configuration energy becomes,
E(X) = E0 −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jijηiηj , (5)
where
Jij ≡ sisjpij , (6)
with Jii = 0 and
E0 =
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jij , (7)
is a constant which dependents on initial propensities and sizes of involved actors (coun-
tries, firms etc). However this constant is independent of actual coalition actor distribu-
tion. As such it has no effect over the dynamics of shifting coalitions in the stable state
searching. Dynamics operates trough the expression,
H = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jijηiηj , (8)
which has to be minimized with respect to {ηi} given {Jij}. Eq. (8) turns out to be the
Ising model Hamiltonian with competing interactions [11]. Cooperation occurs for Jij > 0
while Jij < 0 produces conflict.
Since here the system stable configuration minimizes the energy, the AB model is
indeed at the temperature “T = 0”. Otherwise when “T 6= 0” the free-energy has to be
minimized. In practise for a finite system the theory can tell which coalitions are possible
and how many of them exist. But when several coalitions have the same energy, it is not
possible to predict which one will be the actual one.
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4 The undressed AB model
Above three statements (end of Section 2) by Axelrod and Bennett [10] can be recast as,
Asymmetric size effect, Frustration effect, and Alignment prediction. Unfortunately these
statements are misleading within standing AB model. Respective proofs follow.
4.1 Asymmetric size effect
Though statement of asymmetric size effect sounds reasonable from Eq. (1) it is indeed
not founded. Dynamics and stable minima are obtained from minimization of the Eq.
(3) energy. Cost in “energy” for having two countries not aligning according to their
propensity, is multiplicative of both country sizes. Therefore, in case of a pair of misaligned
countries, respectively large and small, the energy cost is the same whatever country
breaks proper alignment from associated propensity.
4.2 Frustration effect
The frustration statement is misleading with respect to both its physics counterpart and
its meaning in alliances. The physical concept of frustration as introduced by Toulouse
[11] can be defined precisely with the case of Israel, Syria and Iraq mentioned by Axelrod
and Bennett.
We attach respectively the labels 1, 2, 3 to each one of the three countries. In case
we have equal and negative exchange interactions J12 = J13 = J23 = −J with J > 0, the
associated minimum of the energy (Eq. (8)) is equal to −J . However this value of the
minimum is realized for several possible and equivalent coalitions. Namely for countries
(1, 2, 3) we can have respectively alignments (A, B, A), (B, A, A), (A, A, B), (B, A, B),
(A, B, B), and (B, B, A). First 3 are identical to last 3 by symmetry since here what
matters is which countries are together within the same coalition. The peculiar property
is that the system never gets stable in just one configuration since it costs no energy
to switch from one onto another. This case is an archetype of frustration. It means in
particular the existence of several ground states with exactly the same energy.
Otherwise, for non equal interactions the system has one stable minimum and no frus-
tration occurs within the physical meaning defined above. The fact that some interactions
are not satisfied does not automatically imply frustration. Such a situation prevails in
cases studied by Axelrod and Bennett, since minima exist and are stable. In other words,
the fact that the AB model localizes well defined minima is the proof that no frustration
is present in the model. Within the framework of physical models, the AB model with
the associated numerical propensities used to determine their actual output is indeed a
Mattis model, i.e., a random site spin glass without frustration. Since they eventually
found one stable minimum, it means aposteriori that it is possible to find a set of site
variables which will allow a factorisation of their initial pij. However their discussion and
statements are based on a random bond spin glass.
We now make this point more quantitative within the present formalism. Consider a
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given site i. Interactions with all others sites can be represented by a field,
hi =
n∑
j=1
Jijηj (9)
resulting in an energy contribution
Ei = −ηihi , (10)
to the Hamiltonian H = 1
2
∑n
i=1Ei. Eq. (10) is minimum for ηi and hi having the same
sign. For a given hi there exists always a well defined coalition except for hi = 0. In this
case site i is “neutral” since then both coalitions are identical with respect to its local
“energy” which stays equal to zero. A neutral site will flip with probability 1
2
. Such a
situation is absent from AB results.
4.3 Alignement prediction
The prediction power of AB model is more subtle. Above formulation using Eqs. (9,
10) sheds light on what comes really out of AB model. Indeed the ouptput reduces to
the input. According to AB, the coupling {Jij} are given and only one or two minima
are found for the energy. To make the argument simple without loosing in generality, we
assume there exists only one minimum. Once the system reaches its stable equilibrium it
gets trapped and the energy is minimum. At the minimum the field hi can be calculated
for each site i since {Jij} are known as well as {ηi}.
First consider all sites which have the value -1. The existence of a unique non-
degenerate minimum makes associated fields also negative. We then take one of these
sites, e.g. k, and shift its value from -1 to +1 by simultaneously changing the sign of all
its interactions {Jkl} where l runs from 1 to n (Jkk = 0). This transformation gives,
ηk = +1 andhk > 0 , (11)
instead of,
ηk = −1 and hk < 0 , (12)
which means that actor k has shifted from one coalition into the other one.
It is worth to emphazise that such systematic shift of propensities of actor k has no
effect on the others actors. Taking for instance actor l, its unique interaction with actor
k is through Jkl which did change sign in the transformation. However as actor k has
also turn to the other coalition, the associated contribution Jklηk to field hl of actor l is
unchanged.
The shift process is then repeated for each member of actor k former coalition. Once
all shifts are completed there exits only one unique coalition. Everyone is cooperating
with all others. The value of the energy minimum is unchanged in the process.
Above transformation demonstrates the {Jij} determine the stable configuration. It
shows in particular that given any site configuration, it always exists a set of {Jij} which
will give that configuration as the unique minimum of the associated energy. At this stage,
what indeed matters is the calculation of propensities. To get the right output, i.e., the
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right alignment is not a result of the model, but instead, a check of propensity calculation
correctness. Therefore AB output (right alignemnt) reduces to AB input (propensities)
making the statement (c) of Sec. II misleading.
On this basis we can conclude the input, i.e., propensity calculations and thus associ-
ated {Jij} are the relevant and interesting results of Axelrod and Bennett.
However thes data have to be handle with caution depending on the specific cases.
Indeed above gauge transformation shows what matters is the sign of field {hi} and not a
given Jij value. A given set of field signs, positive and negative, may be realized through
an extremely large spectrum of {Jij}.
This very fact opens a way to explore some possible deviations from a national policy.
For instance given the state of cooperation and conflict of a group of actors, it is possible
to find out limits in which local pair propensities can be modified without inducing coali-
tion shift. Some country can turn from cooperation to conflict or the opposite, without
changing the belonging to a given alliance as long as the associated field sign is unchanged.
It means that a given country could becomes hostile to some former allies, still staying
in the same overall coalition. One illustration is given by german recognition of Croatia
against the will of other european partners like France and England, without putting at
stake its belonging to the European community. The Falklands war between England and
Argentina is another example since both countries have strong american partnerships.
5 A new model
The idea to build an “energy”-like approach to describe alignment processes within a group
of actors could be indeed rather powerful. However the proposed AB model was shown
to have many setbacks. Nevertheless at this stage we are in a position to develop another
Statistical Physics like model to address the problem of bimodal coalition phenomena.
Following the AB model we start with a group of n actors and two competing coalitions
A ans B. We keep above notations.
5.1 Setting the model
From historical, cultural and economic frames there exit bilateral propensities pi,j ≡ Gi,j
between any pair of countries i and j to either cooperation (Gi,j > 0), conflict (Gi,j < 0)
or ignorance (Gi,j = 0). Each propensity Gi,j depends solely on the pair (i, j) itself and
is positive, negative or zero. Here factorisation over i and j is not possible. Indeed we
are dealing with competing given bonds or links. It is equivalent to random bond spin
glasses as opposed to Mattis random site spin glasses [12].
Propensities Gi,j are somehow local since they don’t account for any global organiza-
tion or net. However coalitions have been known to exist since long ago. To include such
a macro-level of alignment we consider the case of two competing bimodal coalitions A
and B like for instance western and eastern blocks during the so-called cold war.
Each country has either a natural belonging to one of the two world level coalitions or
not. A variable ǫi is then attached to actor i. It is ǫi = +1 if actor should be in A, ǫi = −1
for B and ǫi = 0 for no coalition belonging. Natural belonging is induced by cultural,
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political and historical interests. Within the two world level coalition framework the
benefit Ji,j gained by exchanges between a pair of countries (i, j) is always positive since
sharing resources, informations, weapons is basically profitable. Nevertheless a pair (i, j)
propensity to cooperation, conflict or ignorance is pi,j ≡ ǫiǫjJi,j which can be positive,
negative or zero. Now we do have a Mattis random site spin glasses [12].
Including both local and macro exchanges result in the pair propensity
pi,j ≡ Gi,j + ǫiǫjJi,j , (13)
between two countries i and j with always Ji,j > 0.
An additional variable βi = ±1 is introduced to account for benefit from economic
and military pressure attached to a given alignment. It is still βi = +1 in favor of A,
βi = −1 for B and βi = 0 for no belonging. The amplitude of this economical and military
interest is measured by a local positive field bi which also accounts for the country size
and importance. At this stage, sets {ǫi} and {βi} are independent.
Actual actor choices to cooperate or to conflict result from the given set of above
quantites. The associated energy is,
H = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
{Gi,j + ǫiǫjJij}ηiηj −
n∑
i
βibiηi , (14)
where {ηi = ±1} are Ising variables which discriminate between the two coalition choice
with ηi = +1 for A and ηi = −1 for B.
5.2 Cold war scenario
The cold war scenario means that the two existing world level coalitions generate much
stonger couplings than purely bilateral ones, i.e., |Gi,j| < Ji,j since to belong to a world
level coalition produces more advantages than purely local unproper relationship. In
others words local propensities were unactivated since overwhelmed by the two block
trend. The overall system was very stable. We can thus take Gi,j = 0. Moreover each
actor must belong to a coalition, i. e., ǫi 6= 0 and βi 6= 0. In that situation local
propensities to cooperate or to conflict between two interacting countries result from
their respective individual macro-level coalition belongings. the cold war energy is,
HCW = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
ǫiǫjJijηiηj −
n∑
i
βibiηi . (15)
5.2.1 Coherent tendencies
We consider first the coherent tendency case in which cultural and economical trends go
along the same coalition, i.e., βi = ǫi. Then from Eq. (15) the minimum of HCW is unique
with all country propensities satisfied. Each country chooses its coalition according to
its natural belonging, i.e., ηi = ǫi. This result is readily proven via the variable change
τ ≡ ǫiηi which turns the energy to,
HCW1 = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jijτiτj −
n∑
i
biτi , (16)
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where Ji,j > 0 are positive constants. Eq. (16) is a ferromagnetic Ising Hamiltonian in
positive symmetry breaking fields bi. Indeed it has one unique minimum with all τi = +1.
The remarkable result here is that the existence of two apriori world level coalitions
is identical to the case of a unique coalition with every actor in it. It shed light on
the stability of the Cold War situation where each actor satisfies its proper relationship.
Differences and conflicts appear to be part of an overall cooperation within this scenario.
Both dynamics are exactly the same since what matters is the existence of a well defined
stable configuration. However there exists a difference which is not relevant at this stage
of the model since we assumed Gi,j = 0. However in reality Gi,j 6= 0 making the existence
of two coalitions to produce a lower “energy” than a unique coalition since then, more
Gi,j can be satisfied.
It worth to notice that field terms biǫiηi account for the difference in energy cost in
breaking a pair proper relationship for respectively a large and a small country. Consider
for instance two countries i and j with bi = 2bj = 2b0. Associated pair energy is
Hij ≡ −Jijǫiηiǫjηj − 2b0ǫiηi − b0ǫjηj . (17)
Conditions ηi = ǫi and ηj = ǫj give the minimum energy,
Hmij = −Jij − 2b0 − b0 . (18)
¿From Eq. (18) it is easily seen that in case j breaks proper alignment shifting to ηj = −ǫj
the cost in energy is 2Jij + 2b0. In parallel when i shifts to ηi = −ǫi the cost is higher
with 2Jij +4b0. Therfore the cost in energy is lower for a breaking from proper alignment
by the small country (bj = b0) than by the large country (bj = 2b0). In the real world, it
is clearly not the same for instance for the US to be against Argentina than to Argentina
to be against the US.
5.2.2 Uncoherent tendencies
We now consider the uncoherent tendency case in which cultural and economical trends
may go along opposite coalitions, i.e., βi 6= ǫi. Using above variable change τ ≡ ǫiηi, the
Hamiltonian becomes,
HCW2 = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jijτiτj −
n∑
i
δibiτi , (19)
where δi ≡ βiǫi is given and equal to ±1. HCW2 is formally identical to the ferromagnetic
Ising Hamiltonian in random fields ±bi. However, here the fields are not random.
The local field term δibiτi modifies the country field hi in Eq. (9) to hi + δibi which
now can happen to be zero. This change is qualitative since now there exists the possi-
bility to have “neutrality”, i.e., zero local effective field coupled to the individual choice.
Switzerland attitude during World war II may result from such a situation. Moreover
countries which have opposite cultural and economical trends may now follow their eco-
nomical interest against their cultural interest or vice versa. Two qualitatively different
situations may occur.
• Unbalanced economical power: in this case we have
∑n
i δibi 6= 0.
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The symmetry is now broken in favor of one of the coalition. But still there exists
only one minimum.
• Balanced economical power: in this case we have
∑n
i δibi = 0.
Symmetry is preserved andHCW2 is identical to the ferromagnetic Ising Hamiltonian
in random fields which has one unique minimum.
5.3 Unique world leader scenario
Now we consider current world situation where the eastern block has disappeared. How-
ever it is worth to emphazise the western block is still active as before in this model.
Within our notations, denoting A the western alignment, we have still ǫi = +1 for coun-
tries which had ǫi = +1. On the opposite, countries which had ǫi = −1 now turned to
either ǫi = +1 or to ǫi = 0.
Therefore above Gi,j = 0 assumption based on inequality |Gi,j| < |ǫiǫj |Ji,j no longer
holds for each pair of countries. In particular propensity pi,j becomes equal to Gi,j in
respective cases where ǫi = 0, ǫj = 0 and ǫi = ǫj = 0.
A new distribution of actors results from the collapse of one block. On the one hand
A coalition countries still determine their actual choices according to Ji,j. On the other
hand former B coaltion countries are now found to determine their choices according to
competing links Gi,j which did not automatically agree with former Ji,j. This subset of
countries has turned from a Mattis random site spin glasses without frustration into a
random bond spin glasses with frustration. In others world the former B coalition subset
has jumped from one stable minimum to a highly degenerated unstable landscape with
many local minima. This property could be related to the fragmentation process where
ethnic minorities and states shift rapidly allegiances back and forth while they were part
of a stable structure just few years ago.
While the B coalition world organization has disappeared, the A coalition world orga-
nization did not change and is still active. It makes |Gi,j| < Ji,j still valid for A countries
with ǫiǫj = +1. Associated countries thus maintain a stable relationship and avoid a frag-
mentation process. This result supports a posteriori arguments against the dissolution of
Nato once Warsaw Pact was disolved.
Above situation could also shed some light on the european debate. It would mean
european stability is a result in particular of the existence of european structures with
economical reality. These structures produce associated propensities Ji,j much stronger
than local competing propensities Gi,j which are still there. In other words european sta-
bility would indeed result from Ji,j > |Gi,j| and not from either all Gi,j > 0 or all Gi,j = 0.
An eventual setback of the european construction (ǫiǫjJi,j = 0) would then automatically
yield a fragmentation process with activation of ancestral bilateral oppositions.
In this model, once a unique economical as well as military world level organisation
exists, each country interest becomes to be part of it. We thus have βi = +1 for each actor.
There may be some exception like Cuba staying almost alone in former B alignment, but
this case will not be considered here. Associated Hamiltonian for the ǫi = 0 subset actor
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is,
HUL = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Gijηiηj −
n∑
i
biηi , (20)
which is formally equivalent to a random bond Hamiltonian in a field. At this stage
ηi = +1 means to be part of A coalition which is an international structure. On the
opposite ηi = −1 is to be in a non-existing B-coalition which really means to be outside
of A.
For small field with respect to interaction the system may still exhibit physical-like
frustration depending on the various Gi,j. In this case the system has many minima with
the same energy. Perpetual instabilities thus occur in a desperate search for an impossible
stability. Actors will flip continuously from one local alliance to the other. The dynamics
we are refering to is an individual flip each time it decreases the energy. We also allow a
flip with probabilty 1
2
when local energy is unchanged.
It is worth to point out that only strong local fields may lift fragmentation by putting
every actor in A-coalition. It can be achieved through economical help like for instance in
Ukrainia. Another way is military A enforcement like for instance in former Yugoslavia.
Our results point out that current debate over integrating former eastern countries
within Nato is indeed relevant to oppose current fragmentation processes. Moreover it
indicated that an integration would suppress actual instabilities by lifting frustration.
5.4 The case of China
China is an extremely huge country built up from several very large states. These state
typical sizes are of the order or much larger than most other countries in the world. It
is therefore interesting to analyse China stability within our model since it represents a
case of simultaneous Cold war scenario and Unique world leader scenario.
There exists n states which are all part of a unique coalition which is the chinese central
state. Then all ǫi = +1 but βi = ±1 since some states keep economical and military
interest in the “union” (βi = +1) while capitalistic advanced rich states contribute more
than their share to the “union” (βi = −1). Associated Hamiltonian is,
H = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
{Gi,j + Jij}ηiηj −
n∑
i
βibiηi , (21)
where Ji,j > 0 and Gij is positive or negative depending on each pair of state (i, j).
At this point China is one unified country which means in particular that Ji,j > |Gij|
for all pair of states with negative Gij . Therefore ηi = +1 for each state. Moreover it
also implies bi < qiJi,j where qi is the number of states state i interacts with. Within this
model, three possible scenari can be oulined with respect to China stability.
1. China unity is preserved.
Rich states will go along their actual economic growth with the central power turning
to a capitalistic oriented federative like structure. It means turning all ǫi to −1 with
then ηi = ǫi. In parallel additional development of poor states is required in order
to maintain condition Ji,j > |Gij| where some Gij are negative.
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2. Some rich states break unity.
Central power is unchanged with the same political and economical orientation
making heavier limitations over rich state development. At some point the condition
bi > qiJi,j may be achieved for these states. These very states will then get a lower
“energy” breaking down from chinese unity. They will shift to ηi = −1 in their
alignment with the rest of China which has ηj = +1.
3. China unity is lost with a fragmentation phenomenon.
In this case, opposition among various states becomes stronger than the central
organisational cooperation with now Ji,j < |Gij| with some negative Gij . The situ-
ation would become spin glass-like and China would then undergo a fragmentation
process. Former China would become a highly unstable part of the world.
6 The risky actor driven dynamics
In principle actors are expected to follow their proper relationship, i.e., to minimize their
local “energy”. In other words, actors follow normal and usual patterns of decision. But
it is well known that in real life these expectations are sometimes violated. Then new
situations are created with reversal of on going policies.
To account for such situations we introduce the risky actor. It is an actor who goes
against his well defined interest. It is different from the frustrated actor which does not
have a well defined interest. Up to now everything was done at “T = 0”. However a
risky actor chooses coalition associated to ηi = −1, although its local field hi is positive.
Therefore the existence of risky actors requires a T 6= 0 situation. The case of Rumania,
having its own independent foreign policy, in former Warsaw Pact may be an illustration of
risky actor behavior. Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus conflict may be another example.
Once T 6= 0, it is not the energy which has to be minimized but the free energy,
F = U − TS , (22)
where U is the internal energy, now different from the Hamiltonian and equal to its thermal
average and S is the entropy. To minimize the free energy means stability of a group of
countries matters on respective size of each coalition but not, which actors are actually
in these coalitions. At a fixed ”temperature” we thus can expect simultaneous shift of
alliances from several countries as long as the size of the coalition is unchanged, without
any modification in the relative strenghts. Egypt quitting soviet camp in the seventies
and Afghanistan joining it may illustrate these non-destabilizing shifts.
Within the coalition frame temperature could be viewed as a way to account for some
risky trend. It is not possible to know which particular actor will take a chance but it is
reasonable to assume the existence of some number of risky actors. Temperature would
thus be a way to account for some global level of risk taking.
Along ideas developped elsewhere [7, 8] we can assume that a level of risky behavior
is profitable for the system as a whole. It produces surprises which induce to reconsider
some aspect of coalitions themselves. Recent danish refusal to the signing of Maastricht
agreement on closer european unity may be viewed as an illustration of a risky actor. The
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net effect have been indeed to turn what seemed a trivial and apathetic administrative
agreement into a deep and passionated debate among european countries with respect to
european construction.
Above discussion shows implementation of T 6= 0 within the present approach of
coalition should be rather fruitful. More elaboration is left for future work.
Last but not least, it is worth to mention two actual fields of research which could
prove useful to our approach at T 6= 0. First, simulated annealing (slowly decreasing
temperature) which helps to find better ground states. And the somehow similar recent
“mutation works” [13]. For our dynamics at T = 0 studies [14] may turn useful.
7 Conclusion
The choice of alliances is probably one of the most crucial questions faced by social sytems
such as individuals, nations, ethnic minorities, firms and so on. The Statistical Physics
based approach opens up a fruitful way to tackle this basic problem.However we showed
that partial use of Physics can be rather misleading. Buiding up a model requires to stick
to what is contained in the equations used.
In this paper we have attempted to propose some new notions to construct a model of
bimodal alliances. We have shown why the cold war organisation after world war II was
rather stable. It was then found how the eastern group disappearance has induced the
emergence of a fragmentation process. Some hints were obtained about possible policies
to stabilize world nation relationships. The importance of european construction was also
pointed out.
We have outlined what could be a dynamics articulated by the presence of actors who
can be either ”risky” or ”frustrated” or “neutral”. A ”risky” actor acts against his well
defined interest while a ”frustrated” actor having no well defined interest, acts randomly.
Associated effects are expected to be instrumental in the building up of alliances.
At this stage, even if the suggested dynamics can be illustrated by some examples or
analogies, our model remains rather primitive. However we feel it opens up some possible
new road to explore and to forecast international policies. A deeper investigation based
on precise data is required to both check the validity of our model and to modify it to
make it more realistic.
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